Re: Platner and the intellectual Twister and Yoga to rehabilitate him...

[WarGamer]

24. Oooppsss. I got receipts.

General Mark Milley (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff): In closed-door briefings to lawmakers in early February 2022, Milley testified that Kyiv could fall within 72 hours of a full-scale Russian invasion (Brooks & Tchantouridzé, 2023; War, 2024).

The Broader Intelligence Community: U.S. intelligence agencies operated under the assumption that Russia's quantitative advantages would quickly overwhelm Ukrainian conventional defenses, forcing the U.S. to plan for supporting a government-in-exile and an underground Ukrainian insurgency rather than a sustained conventional defense.

The German Military & Intelligence: In the opening days of the war, senior German military officials expressed similar public assessments, confidently stating on national television that Ukraine's defeat was mathematically certain and imminent (War, 2024).

French Intelligence: The French military intelligence directorate (DRM) similarly assessed a rapid Russian victory based on conventional force ratios, though its director was later replaced because the agency failed to accurately predict that Vladimir Putin would actually execute the order to cross the border (Shpiro, 2023).

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI): In their extensive post-mortem of the initial invasion phase, analysts noted that Russia's operational plan itself aimed for a swift 10-day blitz to seize Kyiv and intended to complete the full annexation of the country by August 2022—exactly six months after the February launch (Zabrodskyi, 2022). Analysts globally found these expectations realistic based on the sheer 12:1 force ratio advantage Russia initially achieved north of Kyiv (Zabrodskyi, 2022).

The Marine Corps University Press / Military Historians: Academic reviews of the opening months highlight that according to standard military doctrines (like the 3:1 force ratio rule required for successful defense), Ukraine's active-duty numbers should have been easily overwhelmed by a coordinated multi-axis assault (Merkx, 2023).


Brooks, S., & Tchantouridzé, L. (2023). The war in Ukraine: the failure of deterrence. Security Science Journal, 4(2), 18–35. https://doi.org/10.37458/ssj.4.2.2

Dylan, H. (2025). Unveiling Russian intelligence failures in the Ukraine conflict: a strategic culture perspective. Intelligence and National Security, advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2025.2544460
Cited by: 7

Gilliam, J. B., & Van Wie, R. C. (2022). Interim security insights and implications from the first two months of the Russia-Ukraine war. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/FP_20220512_ukraine_war_gilliam_van_wie.pdf
Cited by: 9

Merkx, G. W. (2023). Russia's war in Ukraine: Two decisive factors. Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 14(2), 13–33. https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20231402001

Shpiro, S. (2023). Intelligence and the Ukraine war: Early lessons and research roadmap. National Security and the Future, 24(1). https://www.nsf-journal.hr/nsf-volumes/case-studies/id/1412

Tracy, C. L. (2026). Technological surprise and normalization through use: The tactical and discursive effects of new precision-strike weapons in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Texas National Security Review. https://tnsr.org/roundtable/new-precision-strike-weapons-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war/

War, C. (2024). Russia's war against Ukraine. Ifri Papers. Institut français des relations internationales. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/forsstrom_et_al._russia_seminar_24_web.pdf

Zabrodskyi, M. (2022). Preliminary lessons in conventional warfighting from Russia's invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf